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ABSTRACT: In a now-classic paper, Nancy Cartwright argued that the Humean
conception of causation as mere regular co-occurrence is too weak to make sense of our
everyday and scientific practices.  Specifically she claimed that in order to understand
our reasoning about, and uses of, effective strategies, we need a metaphysically stronger
notion of causation and causal laws than Humeanism allows.
Cartwright’s arguments were formulated in the framework of probabilistic causation,
and it is precisely in the domain of (objective) probabilities that I am interested in
defending a form of Humeanism.  In this paper I will unpack some examples of
effective strategies and discuss how well they fit the framework of causal laws and
criteria such as CC from Cartwright’s and others’ works on probabilistic causality.  As
part of this discussion, I will also consider the concept or concepts of objective
probability presupposed in these works.  I will argue that Cartwright’s notion of a
nomological machine, or a mechanism as defined by Stuart Glennan, is better suited for
making sense of effective strategies, and therefore that a metaphysically primitive
notion of causal law (or singular causation, or capacity, as Cartwright argues in (1989))
is not – here, at least – needed. These conclusions, as well as the concept of objective
probabilities I defend, are largely in harmony with claims Cartwright defends in The
Dappled World.  My discussion aims, thus, to bring out into the open how far
Cartwright’s current views are from a radically anti-Humean, causal-fundamentalist
picture.
0.  Introduction. Throughout her career, Nancy Cartwright has consistently argued
against the Humean prejudices of her logical empiricist predecessors, at least in the
areas of causality and the epistemology of science.  The first assault in her campaign
was the classic paper “Causal Laws and Effective Strategies” (1979, 1983 ch. 1). This
paper argues for two main theses.  First, that there is no way to reduce facts about
causation to facts about probabilistic relations; and second, that in order to understand
the effective strategies we use to achieve desired results, we need to invoke a strong
notion of causal laws.  When we know that it is a causal law that C brings about E (or
raises the level of E, or makes E more probable,  . . .), then we have an effective
strategy for E.  It is only the second thesis that I will be attempting to undermine in this
paper, by showing that the talk of causal laws, and the implicit picture of the (1979)
paper, have some serious faults.
What I will do is focus on aspects of the problematic that Cartwright glosses
over relatively briefly, and try to show how a slightly different way of thinking about
things can work equally well – perhaps better – at uncovering and describing our
effective strategies.  The point will be to show that this different perspective is wholly
compatible with Humeanism about (real, or objective) probabilities, and with
agnosticism about causation as a primitive relation (i.e., causal agnosticism as opposed
to causal fundamentalism).  The goal is to show how we can account for our effective
strategies, without buying wholesale into an ontology of causal laws, singular causation,
1 After I presented the main contents of this article in Oviedo (LMPS ’03), Paul Teller
pointed out to me that Stuart Glennan  has written articles defending a mechanism-
based view of causality that is very close to some of the ideas I advocate here.  See
Glennan (1996, 1997, 2002). 
2 Turnabout is fair play:  Cartwright’s philosophical opponents who believe in
fundamental laws of nature may deserve the epithet “fundamentalist”, but she often
seems to be no less a fundamentalist about causation.  John Norton (2003) used this
term first, I think, and I gladly borrow it from him.
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and capacities. In this sense, I will defend the spirit of Humeanism about causation, at
least in a small way. I will not, however, try to argue for a view effective strategies that
is purged of any taint of causal talk.
In elaborating a different view of effective strategies, I will borrow heavily from
some leading ideas of Cartwright’s latest book, The Dappled World.1 This paper is
therefore an attempt both to defend much of the perspective offered in The Dappled
World, and to show that it contrasts strongly with the causal-fundamentalist picture to
be found in some of Cartwright’s earlier works.
1. Cartwright against Humean probabilistic causation.  In this section I will describe
the main points of Cartwright’s (1979) paper, including the famous criterion CC and
three key examples of effective strategies (Malaria, TIAA-CREF, heart disease). 
Cartwright uses her examples to argue very convincingly that a Humean account of
causation that seeks to reduce causal facts to facts about probability relations is doomed
to fail.  What she offers in its stead is a species of what might be called “causal
fundamentalism”,2 namely a view that takes “causal laws” to be fundamental facts of
our universe.
“If indeed, it isn’t true that buying a TIAA policy is an effective way to lengthen
one’s life, but stopping smoking is, the difference between the two depends on the
causal laws of our universe, and on nothing weaker.”  (1983), p. 22.
I have never felt I understand what a “causal law” is, and in (1983) Cartwright does not
give us an explicit definition.  We do however get an implicit definition:  At least, the
true statements “C  E” that pass the test of principle CC should be counted as causal
laws. Later we will come back to the issue of what constitutes a causal law.
The basic idea of a Humean reductive theory of (probabilistic) causation is that
C causes E if P(E|C) > P(E|-C) and some other conditions (all of which should be non-
causal, i.e. compatible with whatever Humeanism is in play) are satisfied as well.  C
and E should be event types, not particulars, at least in the class of theories of interest to
us here.  Since there are many well-known examples of factors that increase the
probability of an effect E via spurious correlation rather than causation, the real content
of the theory will naturally be in the extra conditions.  For example, since the
probability of lightning is greatly increased by the presence, less than ten seconds later,
of thunder, we need a condition that helps our theory rule out thunder being a cause of
lightning.  Suppes’ (1970) theory of probabilistic causation, one of the first, took a
sensible approach to cases like this:  insist that the cause C must occur before the effect
E.  This by no means finishes the task of eliminating spurious correlations,
unfortunately.  There are ubiquitous cases of effects of a common cause (D  C and D
 E), where C regularly happens before E and is strongly positively correlated with E,
3(1983), p. 26.  Condition (iv) is needed to handle problems that would occur if one held
fixed causes of E that sometimes are intermediate steps between C and E. CC is not itself
immune to counterexamples and problems; see for example Otte (1985).
4(1983), p. 26.
3
but is not a cause of E. Ruling out cases of this form, and a variety of more complicated
forms, is a job that has never proved possible, at least within the strictures of
Humeanism.
Cartwright offers cases with the probability structure known as Simpsons
paradox to illustrate her general argument against the Humean approach to probabilistic
causation.  Let’s take the smoking/heart disease thought example (the probabilities we
will posit are by no means true of any actual populations).  Suppose that it were found
that, in the statistics for the whole adult population, P(HD|SM) < P(HD|-SM).  This
could happen even if smoking is in fact a cause of heart disease and not a preventer of
it.  How?  Well, suppose that regular exercising is a strong preventer of heart disease,
and that as it happens, the frequency of regular exercising is much higher in the
smoking population than in the non-smoking population.  Then the probability relation
mentioned above could hold, yet when we partition the population into exercisers and
non-exercisers (and “hold fixed” this factor, conditionalize on it), the probabilistic
significance of smoking reverses:  P(HD|SM & EX) > P(HD|-SM & EX) and 
P(HD|SM & -EX) > P(HD|-SM & -EX).  And these probabilities, we are to take it,
reflect the true causal facts, that smoking does cause heart disease.
The point Cartwright makes with these examples is simple but devastating:  if
there are other causal factors relevant to an effect E (positively or negatively) that may
induce misleading probabilities, we have to hold them fixed in order for the probability
of E given C to genuinely reflect the fact that C [causes/prevents] E.  So if there are five
other genuine causes/preventers of a given E, Ci for i = 1 to 5, then in order to judge
whether C causes E what we need to look at is the probabilistic relevance of C for E, in
each of the subpopulations where each of these five factors Ci is held fixed (positively
or negatively), e.g., P(E|C & C1 & -C2 & C3 & C4 & -C5).  Formalizing this notion
Cartwright gets CC:
“CC:  C  E iff Prob(E|C & Kj) > Prob(E|Kj) for all state descriptions Kj over
the set {Ci}, where {Ci}satisfies
(i) Ci{Ci}  Ci  +/- E
(ii) C {Ci}
(iii) D (D  +/- E  D = C or D {Ci})
(iv) Ci {Ci}  ¬ (C  Ci). ”
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This is not, of course, an analysis or definition of the causal relation  in terms of
probability, because the relation occurs on both sides of the iff.  It is, rather, as
Cartwright puts it, “. . . the strongest connection that can be drawn between causal laws
and laws of association.”4
It is also a disaster for the basic Humean programme of reducing causation to
probabilistic relations.  Viewing it for the moment as an epistemic recipe, what CC says
is that in order to infer that C is a cause of E from probabilities, one has to first know all
the other causes of E, and examine the effect of C on E in each of the subpopulations
holding fixed a combination +/- of these other causal factors. CC’s truth (if it is true)
does not logically preclude a successful reduction of causation to probabilistic facts. 
But it does make it look rather unlikely, and makes it more natural to see the logical
relationship going in the other direction:  causal facts are (logically, or ontologically)
5Cartwright is explicit that these probabilities must be objective, not subjective, and indeed
the reason is obvious: my (or anyone, including an “ideal rational agent”) having certain
degrees of belief cannot make it the case that C causes E, nor that C is an effective strategy
for bringing about E.
6For a compendium of these arguments, see Hajek (199?).
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 prior, and give rise to the probabilistic facts.  And that is part of Cartwright’s causal
fundamentalist view:  causal relations give rise to probabilistic relations by their
operation, and the latter are at best a dubious tool to be used in trying to infer the
existence of the former.
So much for causal laws, as implicitly defined by CC.  The application to
effective strategies is straightforward: If C  E, then introducing (or augmenting,
increasing, . . .) C is an effective strategy for bringing about E, in all circumstances.
Joining TIAA is not an effective strategy for extending ones’ life, because it is
(presumably) no causal law that joining TIAA  longer life.  And spraying oil on
swamps is an effective strategy for preventing malaria, while burning the blankets of
the sick is not, because of the (presence/absence) of the corresponding causal laws
linking these event types.
Before we take a critical look at the examples of causal laws and effective
strategies used by Cartwright, we need to pause for a moment to think about the
objective probabilities being used in the discussion.5  She discusses the question in
section 2.2 of CLES, and insists that they must be understood as simply sufficiently-
stable [actual] frequencies.  She does not want to make a stronger linkage between
probability and causation possible by going metaphysical, opting for some primitive
notion of propensity or a translation into counterfactuals.  And with this I am in full
agreement: there is no call to ruin a perfectly good notion like objective probability, just
because we can’t make it link up nicely with facts about causation.
“Probabilities serve many other concerns than causal reasoning and it is best to
keep the two as separate as possible. In his Grammar of Science Karl Pearson
taught that probabilities should be theory free, and I agree.”  (1983), p. 39.
As we will see in section 3, however, this simple frequentist view of objective
probabilities lands CC and the associated view of causal laws in great difficulties.  But
before we get to these, in the next section I want to lay out the elements of a different –
but equally empiricist, equally Humean – account of objective chance.
2. Humean objective chance.
The need for a Humean account of objective probabilities (or chance, as I will usually
say) different from simple actual frequentism is not hard to see.  Though not all –
perhaps not even most – of the traditional complaints against actual frequentism are
sound6, still there are some glaring problems that have made the view a nearly extinct
species in recent decades.  First of all, we expect the actual frequencies of things to at
best come close to the real probabilities, an expectation that is weaker the smaller the
number of actual cases involved.  For example, the proportion of heads among well-
flipped coins, in the history of the world, is no doubt near 0.5, but it is also no doubt not
exactly 0.5.  Yet it would be nice to have a way to say that 0.5 is in fact the correct
value of the probability.  The example can be strengthened by considering similar cases
where the numbers are much smaller.  Suppose that a proper roulette wheel with exactly
25 slots was only built once in history, and used just briefly in an obscure French
7Generally when we use a statistic, we would like to give it a sort of causal (or perhaps better,
expectation-guiding) reading.  For example, we would like to use the statistics concerning
incidence of breast cancer in a certain population as though it gave us the probability that a
person who is about to enter that population group contracts breast cancer while a member of
the group.  But it is no such thing (at least, on the face of things).  It is only a genuine
objective probability if read as the probability of obtaining a person who has breast cancer, if
one randomly samples one person from the population.  And this objective probability is,
unfortunately, rarely of use or interest to us.
8See Hoefer (1997), (2003).  My views have developed mainly out of a desire to correct and
perfect the Lewisian approach to chance, but have certainly been influenced also by reading
Cartwright’s works and discussing many issues with her, during the years 1998 - 2002.
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casino.  And suppose that the ball only fell into the 00 slot on that wheel in 2.333
percent of the spins.  It would nevertheless be nice to be able to say that the probability
was in fact 4%, without going off the metaphysical deep end in order to do so. 
A second problem, perhaps worse, is that statistics and frequencies are
ubiquitous, but not all of them should be thought of as probabilities. The frequency of
men with only silver coins in their pockets on Tuesdays that are their birthdays, in the
whole population of such men (on such days) is a statistic of no meaning and no utility. 
Notice that this sort of statistic does not support a temporal reading such as to
potentially guide expectations.  It is not to be identified with the probability that, on my
next Tuesday birthday, I will end up having only silver coins in my pocket. It can be
converted to a probability if we instead read it as the probability of getting someone
who only has silver coins in his pocket, if one randomly selects a man on one of his
Tuesday birthdays from the entire pool of such individuals over all history.  The latter
sort of gloss allows one to turn any mere statistic into a genuine objective probability,
but this does not justify the former sort of reading, which is what we mostly would like
to have.7
It is commonplace now to insist, following Ian Hacking, that objective
probabilities can only be associated to proper chance setups.  Frequentism does not
build in this restriction, even if we add a requirement of stability.  (The method of
translating any statistic into a probability in footnote 7 is, in effect, a method of building
the statistic into a proper chance setup.)  But what sort of a thing is a chance setup, and
how should we motivate the distinction between proper objective chances and mere
statistics?
The account I will briefly sketch reflects the trajectory of my own interest in
probabilities, which began with an interest in David Lewis’ (1994) account and grew off
in a different direction from there.  Cartwright has never had much sympathy for Lewis-
style Humean programmes, and her interest in objective probabilities has always been
closer to the needs and practices of ordinary science.  Despite this difference, I think the
account I will sketch here is very close to the account developed in Cartwright (1999),
chapter 7.8
2.1 What Chances are For.  If you know that something is the case, or you know that
some other thing is definitely going to happen, then you are all set; knowing the
probability of those things is then at most of academic interest to you.  But often we
have to work in circumstances of ignorance.  I don’t know whether it will rain
tomorrow, so knowing the objective probability that it will (if such a thing exists) would
be very useful to me.  If it is less than 20% I will wear my new shoes and not take an
umbrella, but if it is more than 80% I will dress warmly, wear old shoes, and carry my
9I eschew the usual mathematical formulations of PP here in order to make its common sense
nature more clear.
10And also contrary to David Lewis.  See Hoefer (2003) for discussion of why linking
objective chance to indeterminism is a mistake.
11But not necessarily all the phenomena that we typically pretend have objective chances. 
For example, it is far from clear to me that there is an objective chance of it raining
tomorrow, in Castelldefels (Spain).  (In Europe, unlike the U.S., weather forecasters rarely
give numerical probabilities in their forecasts.)
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big umbrella. Objective probability is, in the now well-known phrase, a “guide to life”. 
That is its nature or essence, if you like, and this role is neatly captured in David Lewis’
“Principal Principle”, which says roughly:
PP: If you have no background knowledge relevant to whether or not it is (or
will be) the case that A, other than perhaps background knowledge concerning
the objective chance of A, then if you come to believe that the objective chance
of A is in fact x, your subjective degree of belief in the truth of (or coming to
pass that) A, should also be x.9
PP is meant to be a rather obvious principle of rationality: if you don’t follow it, you are
either being perverse in some way, or falling short of logical coherence, or you simply
don’t understand the concept of objective chance. The point of saying that the
probability of 6 upon rolling a fair die is 1/6 is precisely to indicate what a rational
degree of belief (hence rational/fair betting behavior, etc.) in that outcome is.  It is not
just a shorthand way of saying what the actual frequency of 6's is, in the past or even in
all of history, though we do expect chances and frequencies to be numerically close, in
most cases.  Nor is it a way of saying that there are 6 possible ways for a die to land and
that we are indifferent between them.  Not only are there other cases where we can “be
indifferent” in two or more ways, yielding contradictory prescriptions for the
probabilities, but moreover mere indifference is no grounds for saying what objective
chances are.  If you know nothing about a die that someone hands you, then you
certainly don’t know what its chance of landing 6 is!  On the other hand if you know
that it is a perfect cube (with rounded edges), has uniform density and is not magnetic,
etc., then you may indeed have grounds for saying that the chance of heads is 1/6, but
these grounds are not best thought of as a matter of “indifference”.
Finally, to say that the chance of heads is 1/6 is not to attribute a mysterious
causal power to the die that “necessitates” a roll of 6 – but only to the degree 1/6. 
Whatever that might mean.  There are too many varieties of propensity theories of
chance to try to survey them here, but what I want to emphasize is that whatever
objective chances are, they are certainly compatible with the reign of determinism at the
level of physical law (contrary to what at least many propensity theorists claim).10  One
of the claims I will argue for below is that there may be fewer objective chances out
there than some people assume.  But I would argue strenuously that it can’t be the case
that there are none (or none whose value is neither zero nor one).  Objective
probabilities are the kinds of features of reality displayed par excellence in gambling
devices and coin flippings, and presumably radium decays and many other
phenomena.11  A view which says that there are no objective chances if the world turns
out to be at bottom deterministic, is in my view just changing the topic of conversation. 
Even if the world is deterministic, we (in our ignorance) still need all the guides to life
we can get.  There are indeed features of reality that we can see will serve to play the
12Here I am presupposing that the frequencies in past cases determine the frequentist
objective probability.  If instead all past and future cases were included, then narrowing in on
the frequency in the reference class of days-like-today with only one member (namely,
today) would yield a “frequency” (either 0, if in fact it doesn’t rain tomorrow) or 1 ( if it
does) that is splendid for guiding credence about rain tomorrow.  But nobody wants to
salvage PP by making the concept of chance degenerate into that of truth/falsity.
13I have not discussed so-called “hypothetical frequentism” because it seems to me that such
accounts usually amount to propensity theories, once they are fully spelled out.  What a
Humean wants is to identify chances with some actual facts – aspects or patterns, of some
sort, in the huge panoply of actual events, able to play the chance role as specified in PP.  If,
after identifying the chances as something actual, one wishes to go on and assert that, in
addition, they inform us about what limiting frequencies would result if the antecedent
conditions could be repeated infinitely, that is one’s own business.  I personally don’t see the
need for this metaphysical extravagance.
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role of guide as specified in PP – such as the features of a fair die mentioned earlier,
plus what we know about how people throw dice and how they bounce, etc. – so there
are objective probabilities in the world
Like David Lewis, I claim that what chances are for (as expressed in PP) is our
best guide to what chances are.  Objective chances must, at the least, be facts that entail
the rationality or correctness, in some sense, of the Principal Principle.  Now I will
sketch a Humean view of objective chance that is meant to satisfy this constraint.
2.2 What chances are.  A proper Humean empiricist will insist that objective
probabilities, whatever they may be, must at least supervene on the sum total of actual
events in world history.  They are not some mysterious or hidden springs lurking
underneath (as some views take the laws of nature to be) and forcing the world’s events
to be the way they are.  Instead they are patterns that can be discerned in the vast
panoply of events occurring in the world.  What kind of patterns?  Finite frequentism
answers the question in a simple way: relative frequencies.  Or perhaps:  relative
frequencies meeting certain tests of stability and distribution.  But there are too many of
these relative frequencies, and that undermines the sensibility of PP.  The chance of rain
tomorrow in Castelldefels should be defined as the relative frequency of rain-the-next-
day in a reference class of preceding-days “like today”.  But –  like today, in which
respects?  If we specify too many respects, we whittle our reference class down to
nothing, or nearly-nothing, in which case it would seem wrong to let the frequency
guide our credence. (If the chance of rain does exist, I am certain that it is neither 0 nor
1.0!)12 On the other hand, there may be no good reason (from the perspective of simple
Humean frequentism) to choose one set of attributes that days “like today” share, over
another set; and the other set will likely give different frequencies. This is why it is
better to let go of frequentism,13 and move to a more sophisticated Humean account
based on the two key notions of best systems and nomological machines.
Lewis (1994) offers a package account of laws and objective chances together,
one that in effect says objective chances (if they exist) are dictated by laws of nature.  It
is called a best systems account because it meets the demands of Humeanism by
defining the laws of nature as a set of axioms that systematize the patterns in actual
occurrent events, obtaining a “best” combination of simplicity and strength.  In our
world, it may be that the best system of axioms we can have does not deterministically
specify what will be the case, always and everywhere, but rather tells us the objective
probability of various occurrences.  These then are the objective chances.
14If coin flipping is not best thought of as a deterministic Newtonian process (e.g., if quantum
interactions between coin and air molecules play an important role), then other sources of
micro-stochasticity may be involved.  But either way, it is the random-lookingness of
influences at the micro-level (relative to the coin) that account for the actual statistical
behaviours of coins.
15See the film “Rosenkrantz and Guildenstern are Dead” for a lovely example of the
breakdown of this postulate.
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There is no space here to go into the details of Lewis’ account and the many
ways in which (I believe) it goes astray.  What I do wish to keep from his account is the
idea of chances supervening on actual occurrences, and the idea of systematic patterns
to be discerned in those occurrences, patterns that may be something more than just
actual frequencies, and which can sensibly play the role of chance defined in PP.  Just
to give the simplest example of how this may work: The overall pattern of events may
exhibit the kind of behavior patterns known as Newtonian mechanics (for middle-sized
objects in certain circumstances).  That fact, plus the symmetry of objects like coins and
dice, gets us almost all the pattern-facts we need to see that the chance of heads on
flipping a coin is 1/2 (and 1/6, respectively, for the die).  The further fact we need is an
aspect of the overall pattern of events that is truly crucial to the existence of objective
chances. We might call it the “micro-stochasticity of events”.  In the case of coin flips,
what this refers to is the fact that there is a nice random-looking distribution in the size,
angle, etc. of the initial impulses given to coins in ordinary coin flips.  If coin flipping is
basically a Newtonian phenomenon, then it is the random-looking distribution of these
initial impulses that makes coin flips display the approximate 50/50 distribution we rely
on.14
      The stochastic-lookingness of initial conditions, boundary conditions, influences
from outside, etc., is such an important aspect of the overall Humean pattern of actual
events that it deserves a title, and I propose to call it the Stochasticity Postulate.  I call it
a “postulate” because we don’t know, for a guaranteed fact, that we can rely on it
everywhere and at all times.15  But it is as well-confirmed as anything in our scientific
world-picture, and we rely on it to make many of our machines – nomological or
otherwise – function predictably and reliably.  It is not restricted to microphysics; for
the purposes of economics, the car-buying decisions of consumers may supply the
micro-stochasticity that is needed for an efficient model of new-car-delivery to work
adequately well.  Exaggerating only slightly, we might put the Stochasticity Postulate
like this: all over the place, at all sorts of levels, events are nicely random-looking.  It is
this fact, above all else, that grounds the existence of Humean objective chances.
But the stochastic-lookingness of events does not, by itself, give us stable and
reliable objective chances of the kind that could (ideally) serve to guide belief as per
PP.  We need in addition a stable structure or set of conditions that utilize this
stochasticity, in constrained ways, to generate stable probabilities.  As I said earlier, we
need proper chance set-ups.  Generally I will follow Cartwright (1999)’s terminology
and describe these setups as probability-generating nomological machines.  A
nomological machine is a stable arrangement of things, with appropriate shielding as
needed, that generates a regularity.  A probability-generating nomological machine (or
stochastic nomological machine, SNM, as I propose to call them) is a well-defined
setup or arrangement of things that produces outcomes with a well-defined probability.
It is thus something over and above mere superficial Humean “laws of association”
(i.e., actual frequencies), and will therefore violate Pearson’s admonition to avoid
9entanglement with theory – but only, I think, to an extent that is both harmless and
unavoidable.
The best examples of SNMs are, naturally, classical gambling devices, so let us
look at a few of them to illustrate the main points.
1. The coin flipper. Not every flip of a coin is an instantiation of the SNM we implicitly
assume is responsible for the fair 50/50 odds of getting heads or tails when we flip coins
for certain purposes.  Young children’s flips often turn the coin only one time; flips
where the coin lands on a grooved floor not infrequently fail to yield either heads or
tails; Persi Diaconis was alleged to be able to reliably achieve statistics far from 50/50
when flipping a coin in an apparently normal way (and he is no doubt not the first
person to achieve this); and so on.  Yet there is a wide range of circumstances that do
instantiate the SNM of a fair coin flip, and we might characterize the machine roughly
as follows:
i. The coin is given a goodly upward impulse, so that it travels at least a foot upward
and at least a foot downward before being caught or bouncing;
ii. The coin rotates while in the air, at a decent rate and a goodly number of times;
iii. The coin is a reasonable approximation to a perfect disc, with reasonably uniform
density and uniform magnetic properties (if any);
iv. The coin is either caught by someone not trying to achieve any particular outcome,
or is allowed to bounce and come to rest on a fairly flat surface without interference
v. If multiple flips are undertaken, the initial impulses should be distributed randomly
over a decent range of values so that both the height achieved and the rate of spin do
not cluster tightly around any particular value.
Two points about this SNM are worth mentioning right off.  First, the characterization
is obviously vague.  This is not a defect.  If you try to characterize what is an
automobile, you will generate a description with similar vagueness at many points. 
This does not mean that there are no automobiles in reality.  Second, the last clause
refers to a “random distribution” in the initial impulses, and this might seem to be
cheating, or creating some sort of vicious circularity.  But in fact this is not the case. 
“Random” here simply means “random-enough looking” and has nothing to do with a
mysterious “process-randomness” that fails to supervene on the actual happenings.  For
example, we might instantiate our SNM with a very tightly calibrated flipping machine
that chooses (a) the size of the initial impulse, and (b) the distance and angle off-center
of the impulse, by selecting the values from a pseudo-random number generating
algorithm.  In “the wild”, of course, the reliability of nicely randomly-distributed initial
conditions for coin flips is an aspect of the Stochasticity Postulate.
2. The biased coin flipper.  Here I will describe a proper machine, and not worry
whether Persi Diaconis or other practitioners of legerdemain fit the description. 
Suppose we take the tightly-calibrated coin flipper (and “fair” coin) mentioned above,
and:  make sure that the coins land on a very flat and smooth, but very mushy surface
(so that they never, or almost never, bounce); try various inputs for the initial impulses
until we find one that regularly has the coin landing heads when started heads-up, as
long as nothing disturbs the machine; and finally, shield the machine from outside
disturbances.  Such a machine can no doubt be built (probably has been built, I would
guess), and with enough engineering sweat can be made to yield as close to chance =
1.0 of heads as we wish.
This is just as good an SNM as the ordinary coin flipper, if perhaps harder to
achieve in practice.  Both yield a regularity, namely a determinate objective probability
16In Hoefer (1997) I argue that any Humean approach to chance is obliged to take this stance,
denying the possibility of radically improbable outcomes for large sets of chance events such
that the actual frequencies diverge strongly from the alleged objective chances.
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of the outcome heads.  But it is interesting to note the differences in the kinds of
“shielding” required in the two cases.  In the first, what we need is shielding from
conditions that bias the results (intentional or not).  Conditions i, ii, iv and v are all, in
part at least, shielding conditions.  But in the biased coin flipper the shielding we need
is of the more prosaic sort that many of our finely tuned and sensitive machines need:
protection from bumps, wind, vibration, etc.  Yet, unless we are aiming at a chance of
heads of precisely 1.0, we cannot shield out these micro-stochastic influences
completely!  This machine makes use of the micro-stochasticity of events, but a more
delicate and refined use.  We can confidently predict that the machine would be harder
to make and keep stable, than an ordinary 50/50 -generating machine.  There would be a
tendency of the frequencies to slide towards 1.0 (if the shielding works too well), or
back toward 0.5 (if it lets in too much from outside).
3. The radium atom decay.  Nothing much needs to be said here, as current scientific
theory says that this is a SNM with no moving parts and no need of shielding.  In this
respect it is an unusual SNM, and some will wish for some explanation of the reliability
of the machine.  Whether we can have one or not remains to be seen.
In each of these cases we are able to describe a repeatable set of conditions that
constitute the chance setup or SNM, and give at least some reasons for expecting it to
yield a fairly reliable regularity.  Sometimes the reasons may be expressed in causal
terms; I think Cartwright expects this to be the case most, if not all the time.  The
reasons may also be grounded partly or wholly in what we take to be laws of nature, as
is the case in the biased flipper (presumably modellable decently well with classical
mechanics) and the radium atom (where the decay half-life follows from laws of
quantum mechanics). This may seem to undermine the Humean credentials of objective
probabilities.  But there are two responses to this worry.  First, there is an ineradicable
link (or constraint) between the chances and the actual outcomes, at least when the
numbers are high enough: had 99% of all coin flips in history landed heads despite the
apparent satisfaction (in a huge variety of different ways) of conditions i - v, we would
have to say that the objective chance of heads is 0.99, not 0.5.16 The objective chances
may be different from the actual frequencies, to some extent, in light of features of the
chance setup (such as physical symmetry, presumed random-looking distribution of
initial and boundary conditions, and so on), but not greatly different, at least not when
the numbers are high. This constraint arises automatically from the need to satisfy PP.
If chance is to be a good guide to belief, and 0.99 of all coin flips in world history land
heads, then the chance had better be 0.99 too, or very close to it.
 Second, while we may need to use causal and/or law-talk in describing our
reasons for believing in the reliability of an SNM, we are not committed to any
particular metaphysical account of these notions.  Lewis, for example, offers accounts
both of laws and of causation that satisfy his view of Humean supervenience.  While I
do not subscribe to those accounts, the point remains that this Humean account of
objective probabilities leaves it an open question what account of causation or of laws is
best (if any is needed at all, in the end).  The notion of a SNM does not come loaded
with any particular anti-Humean notion of probabilistic propensity.  Indeed, in most of
the cases I can think of, causal talk covers mainly the “deterministic” part of the
17Cartwright (1999) borrows the first two examples from a discussion by Mary Morgan and
David Hendry (1995).
18This does not mean that there are no SNMs in economics generally.  And with some work,
we can imagine a fictional setup for the UK economy that might constitute a genuine SNM
for inflation of a certain level.  But the actual world is not such a setup.
19 Actually, I am making this up, I do not know how this process works.  But I assume some
people do.  More importantly, the true story will have a number of stages to it, like my
possibly-fictional reconstruction here.
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workings of an SNM (e.g., for coin flips: what goes up, comes down because of
gravity), while the part of the description that justifies the stochasticity, and the
expectation of a stable probability, adverts mainly to the “randomness” of the inputs to
the SNM from outside (force of the impulse on the coin or roulette ball, disturbing
effects from random wind forces, etc.).  And that is all just part of the Humean-
acceptable pattern of actual events.
4. Inflation > 6% in the UK economy.  What is the probability that inflation will exceed
6%, next year, in the UK?  This example, as well as 1. and 2. above, is discussed in
Cartwright (1999).17  But this is an example of something that is not a proper chance set
up, not a SNM.  Why?  It simply has none of the elements of such: no repeatable
structure that it is reasonable to expect to generate a stable probability.  If we are to
correctly ascribe an objective probability, it would have to be based on a stable,
enduring structure that is such as to reliably yield that probability.  But over the years,
both the meaning and structure of these notions (UK, inflation) changes greatly. There
is no reason to think that any SNM is out there, waiting to be discerned by economists,
that in fact grounds an objective P(I>6%|UK).18  If the UK economy lasts a few hundred
years more and if we could see the statistics for all years, my guess is that there would
probably not be any stable regularity discernible in them (e.g., inflation > 6% in
approximately 3 out of every 18 years).  Certainly, we cannot discern any reason why
there should be such a regularity.  There is no chance-generating nomological machine
here, and so there is no objective chance.
Unfortunately, the vast majority of statistics that we can gather in economics,
medicine, and other sciences – even statistics that we feel are important, and that we
wish to understand and control –  will be like this example, and not like the first three. 
There are many more statistics in the world than objective chances.  For statistics can be
seen everywhere, but genuine nomological machines – stochastic or otherwise – are
much more rare.
Now we can return to the topic of causal laws and effective strategies. 
3. Re-thinking the examples.  How does spraying oil on swamps prevent malaria?
We know the answer very well:19  Particles of oil kill mosquitos when ingested (or
when they land on larvae, perhaps); mosquitos are the carriers of the malaria virus;
when the swamps are sprayed, some mosquitos should be killed (or larvae killed); so
there should be fewer mosquitos around afterward; hence fewer mosquito bites; hence
fewer bites by malaria-carrying mosquitos; hence fewer cases of malaria.  Each of these
steps makes common-sense causal sense; but each is also merely probabilistic, in some
sense.  The oil may kill more or fewer mosquitos, but is unlikely to kill all; fewer
mosquitos should mean fewer bites, though of course that depends on how active the
remaining mosquitos are; fewer bites should mean fewer bites transmitting malaria,
20In Dupré and Cartwright (1988) and Cartwright (1989) she does allow that failures of
contextual unanimity may occur, and she does not endorse it except where it reflects the
presence of a stable causal capacity.  But the reason for its failure in these works is “mixed”
causal powers on the part of some causes, or interaction, rather than statistical bad luck.
21Some philosophers think of the “true probabilities” not as metaphysical propensities, but
rather as parts of scientific models of certain situations.  This is not the place to discuss the
virtues of such a proposal, and how it may differ from the Humean account I favor; what
matters here is that we are looking at situations for which we have no model, nor any reason
to think that (in a non-trivial sense) we can have one.
22In (1989) probabilities are no longer actual frequencies for Cartwright, and instead are
something more idealized. She does not give an overt account of what they are, but the
perspective of Nature’s Capacities may be seen as moving toward the view adopted in
Dappled World.
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though again it depends on precisely how active the malaria-carrying mosquitos are,
and how frequently their bites do in fact transmit the virus; and so on. In fact, at any of
these stages if things don’t happen to go the way one expects (due to chance, or unusual
initial conditions if one prefers to think of it deterministically), then the oil-spraying
may fail to reduce the rate of malarial infection.  The problem for Cartwright’s (1979)
picture is this:  this mooted failure of the “right” statistical relation to obtain is not due
to any “missing” causal factors for malaria that we have failed to hold fixed.  “Bad luck
with which mosquitos survived” and “Bad luck with which mosquitos bit more” are not
causes that Cartwright can recognize, or declare to be part of “the causal laws of the
universe”.
This sort of bad luck might have turned out to be universal in the whole
reference class of oil-sprayed-swamps.  More realistically, it might just happen in a few
cases, leading to (say) the probability of malaria going up in one or more of the
reference classes ^ Ki  mentioned in CC.  Let’s suppose this happens for the class in
which we hold fixed {Don’t drink quinine, use bug repellent, European ancestry, etc.} 
Then contextual unanimity (Dupre’s term for the demand that the probability change in
the same direction in all reference classes ^ Ki) would fail, contrary to what Cartwright
thinks is possible in (1979).20
         But we need to dig deeper into several aspects of this case, especially the
probabilities.  For there would be an obvious response to this example, if Cartwright
were supposing the probabilities in CC to be the “true” probabilities, identical to the
“real” propensities of systems of such-and-so type. The response would be:  well, these
statistics just don’t count; they don’t reflect the true probabilities. CC is still true, but
only of the true probabilities.
 But as we noted earlier, Cartwright does not hold with such things (which are in
effect chances-as-metaphysical-propensities), and she is right not to.21 Instead, as we
saw, for Cartwright in 1979/1983, probabilities are just actual frequencies meeting
certain tests.  And that’s not bad, from my perspective:  it is better than invoking
mythical propensities or hypothetical frequencies, and some such actual frequencies are
indeed objective probabilities.  But not all, by any means!  And surely the frequencies
of malaria infection, in the tiny populations in which all these K-factors are held fixed,
are not – or are not all – genuine Humean OC probabilities.  In fact, they are unlikely
even to meet Cartwright’s criteria of stability and so on. Nor, I would guess, will they in
general meet the criteria for a chance-generating SNM.22
One might think that, once all the causal factors are held fixed and the situations
of the classes    ^ Ki  clearly defined, then a stable SNM must surely be the result. 
23 By “correspond” here I just mean that two conditions are fulfilled:  (a) the objective
chances do, in fact, exist; and (b) the statistics being looked at are appropriately close to
them.  Typically causal searchers hoping to infer causal relationships from statistical
data only consider condition (b), and deal with it by making it an unabashed, optimistic
starting assumption.
24 Of course, not every theorist of probabilistic causation defends the kind of contextual
unanimity found in CC, and there are alternatives to CC that weaken the requirement. 
They do so, however, to handle cases like the “mixed causal capacity” of birth control
pills to both cause and prevent thrombosis.  That is not the sort of problem we are
looking at here.  The problems arising from either non-existence of objective
probabilities, or (if one takes the probabilities to be by definition the actual statistics)
accidentally misleading statistics, affect these other versions of probabilistic causation
just as much as they do the views of Cartwright (1983).
25“A generic claim, such as ‘Aspirins relieve headaches’, is best seen as a modalized singular
claim: ‘An aspirin can relieve a headache’; and the surest sign that an aspirin can do so is that
sometimes one does so.”  (1989), p. 95.
13
Unfortunately, this is just not so, in general. The patterns among events at the macro-
and micro-levels, relative to mosquito bites and so on, may not display any systematic
regularity that entails, e.g., that in a particular homogeneous reference class, the chance
of infection should be .046 rather than .054. The chance is supposed to reflect what
would occur were the reference classes sufficiently large; but the actual patterns of
events simply are not enough to dictate an answer to this question. This is in contrast
with systems such as gambling devices, where the physical symmetries and the even
distribution of initial and boundary conditions found all over the place in nature do
dictate well-defined chances.
 What if there really are no probabilities out there, in the reference classes
holding fixed all the causally relevant factors?  Then the project of deriving causal laws
from probabilistic data is impossible to even begin.  That is no big loss, however, since
we already knew that we had to know, ahead of time, what all the other causally
relevant factors are (to hold them fixed), in order to prove that a given factor is indeed a
cause.  Our knowledge of “the causal laws” has to be anyway, on Cartwright’s (1979)
view, before we can look to probabilistic data to help complete it.  As Cartwright has
often stressed, the situation may not be so bad: if we feel we know enough about the
causal structure(s) at issue, we may be able to use randomized controlled trials to
discover whether C raises the probability of E in various subpopulations that we can’t
examine individually. But this only salvages the utility of the CC-based method on the
assumption that the method is applicable in the first place, i.e., assuming that all the
statistics we need to look at correspond to genuine objective chances.23  Unfortunately,
this will not be true in general, at least if we understand objective chances in the way
that I advocate here, or that Cartwright advocates in Dappled World. 
What is it, for there to be a causal law of our universe that C causes E? CC
cannot now be taken as part of the answer to this question.  Contextual unanimity may
fail (in actual statistics) for non-causal reasons, as well as the causal reasons recognized
by writers on causation; and, much more importantly, the objective probabilities
invoked in CC may simply fail to exist.24  Instead, we must fall back on the answer from
Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement (1989):  it is a causal law that C causes E
just in case some c’s do, on some occasions, by virtue of being c’s, cause e’s.25  And
this singular causation concept is one that notoriously resists all attempts at further
definition (or analysis), though I think we can say two things about Cartwright’s views
26 As before, I am making this up, and as before the details do not matter for the
philosophical points being illustrated.
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on the matter, based on her later writings.  First, at least in some cases the common-
sense counterfactual is true:  “If c had not occurred, e would not have occurred.”
Second, again at least sometimes, C will be part of an INUS condition for E, hence a
particular c may occur along with the rest of a set of circumstances instantiating an
INUS condition, and jointly necessitate e. But since we know we can’t really count on
these explications being right all the time, basically we are down to this:  that c
singularly causes e is a primitive relation that we know how to recognize sometimes,
and thank goodness, for without it we could never get science started.
While this last part is hard to deny – it is the core of Cartwright’s view of how
science works, and it is the most true-to-life account anyone has yet offered – still it is
possible to chip at it around the edges, and I think it is important to do so.  Because
again we seem to be retreating to a black-box perspective on causation, and again there
are at least some cases where we know a lot about the internal mechanism.  We could
look back at the malaria case now, since we do know a lot about the internal
mechanism.  But it is an awkward example to use (and this in fact undercuts
Cartwright’s story, to some extent), because it is hard to take seriously the singular-
causation version of the mooted causal law.  “Some oil-sprayings do sometimes prevent
malaria infections.”  No doubt they do, but it is hard to read this in a singular-causation
(prevention) way: whose malaria infections were prevented?  Or at least, how many?
Nor is an INUS condition reading very easy to put on the case, given that, as we saw,
the effect is in some sense likely, but by no means necessitated to happen.
So instead let’s take Cartwright’s favourite example:  some aspirin-takings do
relieve headaches.  Here too, we know a lot now about the mechanisms inside the black
box causal statement.26  Aspirin molecules float around in the stomach and get absorbed
into the bloodstream.  There, they mix thoroughly into the blood, and so some get
pumped toward the brain.  Because the molecules are small enough, they pass through
the blood-brain barrier.  The molecules then interact with the swollen vein and artery
walls in the head, causing (by a yet-more-microscopic mechanism, which we will skip
over) reduction in the swelling.  The reduced swelling relieves the pressure that causes
the pain.
That’s an awful lot of structure, hidden underneath a black-box-style singular
causation statement.  In fact it can be considered quite analogous to the oil-swamp-
malaria case.  At any of several stages of the story, the process relies on what are
essentially statistical regularities (not brute cause-effect relationships, not necessitations
supported by the (non-probabilistic) laws of nature):  how many aspirin particles and of
what size pass into the blood; how many pass into the relevant area of the brain; how
many of these get into interactions that help reduce swelling; and so on.  At each of
these stages there is presumably a wide numerical distribution of the relevant events
that may result, even when things go “normally”.  And as in the malaria case, only
perhaps more plausibly here, sometimes not enough reduction in swelling will result to
cause headache-relief.   And this will happen by mere chance, we may say, or by “hap”,
or “just as a matter of random bad luck”.
When this occurs for the reasons just posited, we may advert to a useful
metaphor and say that the cause “failed to fire” as a purely chance matter of fact.  This
can be misleading, though, in two respects.  First, the metaphor calls to mind the
(apparently) irreducible failure-to-decay that may be demonstrated, in a given stretch of
27 Until, perhaps, we get down to the micro-chemical molecular interactions, which are in some
sense quantum-mechanical – what matters here is not whether irreducible causation enters the
picture somewhere deep down, but rather whether it is present at the level we start with.
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time, by a radioactive atom.  That is not a good comparison, since here we can in
principle understand the failure to fire.  The aspirin does what it always does, it is just
that the micro-movements of its particles after swallowing happen not to be good
enough to relieve the headache.  We have a lot to say about whatmay have occurred,
and none of it is black-box or irreducible.27  Second, there is a temptation to assimilate
this failure to fire to genuine “probabilistic causation”, thereby implying that there is
some objective probability for this failure to occur (in a given population) at all times.
But for the kinds of reasons already discussed above, there may in fact be no such
objective probability.
The other way of thinking of the aspirin’s failure, consonant with the typical
discussions of mixed capacities and interactions, would be to suppose that some cause
prevents the aspirin from curing the headache.  This may be wrong-headed as well. The
aspirin may well not, on such an occasion, have been “prevented” from relieving the
headache by any well-characterized factor whose causal power goes in the opposite
direction, so to speak. Maybe it sometimes is, maybe even most times when it fails, it is. 
But it need not always be viewable that way. That is what my description was meant to
highlight:  the aspirin doesn’t necessarily fail because some more-powerful-headache-
causer or aspirin-action-preventer wrestles it to the ground, but rather because at the
micro-level, things just don’t happen to go the way they normally do.
When we look inside the black boxes of probabilistic causation, at least sometimes –
and perhaps every time – we find a lot of stuff going on that is best described as a
sequence of “causal” steps that rely on statistical regularities.  Like the coin-flipping
SNM, we can think of them as based around (fairly-)reliable statistical regularities that
are treated either as unexplained, or as arising from the result of initial and boundary
conditions given underlying natural laws.  We may like to say that taking aspirin is an
effective strategy for getting rid of a headache, because of aspirin’s “causal capacity” to
relieve headaches.  But underneath the metaphors of powers struggling and capacities
firing, what’s really going on is the existence of some regularities that are stable and
repeatable (-enough), which we exploit cleverly for our own ends.
Now let’s turn to effective strategies. In the malaria case, or the aspirin-taking case, I
have been arguing that the CC-based causal law story breaks down upon close
examination. A fortiori, it would seem, we can’t claim these are effective strategies on
the basis of the truth of some causal laws.  But that does not mean that these are not
effective strategies!  They probably are, in many or most circumstances.  But in
explicating why they are, we should avoid both talk of causal laws, and talk of specific
objective chances at work in the strategies (either at the gross, desired-outcome level, or
at the level of the underlying steps in the mechanism).  Oil spraying and aspirin-taking
are effective strategies not because there is an SNM (or NM) to be discerned in their
working, but rather (merely) a mechanism that can be expected to work at least
sometimes – perhaps often, if we are lucky.
Here, then, we see one big difference betwen NM’s and mechanisms in general:
a mechanism need not give rise to a stable regularity.  It simply has the potential, by
virtue of its structure, to give rise to a certain outcome (or output) – when things go
right.  How often and how reliably they do go right is a separate question.  Aspirin-
28See Glennan (1997) for extended criticism of the singular-causation perspective on
capacities found in Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement.
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taking is an effective strategy for curing a headache just because there exists the
mechanism described above, that can (and does) function some of the time.
 Before we say more about this view of effective strategies, I want to finish
criticizing the causal law-based picture by looking at one more of Cartwright’s central
cases. Why isn’t joining TIAA-CREF an effective strategy for extending your life? 
Well, actually, it might be, as Cartwright herself notes; and only a little imagination is
needed to work out reasons why it could be.  But let’s suppose that on the whole it is
not, in fact.  Cartwright’s (1979) story about why it is not goes like this:   There is in the
overall population a correlation between belonging to TIAA and having longer-than-
average life. But once we partition the population into sub-classes in which we hold
fixed the true causes of longevity (exercise?  wealth? happiness? good genes? good
diet? . . .)  the correlation disappears.  And at the level of singular causation, we can
note:  joining TIAA just never does cause longer life, in any individual case.
It is now clear what’s deeply wrong about this story.  First, the list of things that
might be thought to affect longevity is too big, open-ended, and ill-defined for CC (or
its strategies-directed correlate, from section 2 of (1983)) to be useful.  And contrary to
the “singular causes first” view of Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement, I would
argue that there is no fact of the matter about whether, for example, 1 hour of hard
exercise in the hot sun increases, decreases, or fails to affect my longevity.  And the
same could be said for a myriad of factors that may, statistically, be positively or
negatively associated with lifespan.28  But even at a non-singular level, the same
problem arises:  does exercising in the hot sun regularly or eating yoghurt daily cause
greater longevity?  There are reasons for answering yes, others for answering no, and
still others for saying that there’s no fact of the matter.  (No SNM.)  If we did manage to
agree on a list of causes, and we partitioned the whole population up by homogeneity in
these causes, our subpopulations would be too small to support genuine probabilities,
on either my or Cartwright’s early account of these.  So the CC story just fails to make
sense here. 
 Returning to TIAA at the level of singular causation: as in the malaria case,
only much more so here, the mooted cause is so far removed from its effect, that (a) the
notion of singular causing hardly seems decently applicable, but (b) if it is, then it is
highly implausible that for no-one does joining TIAA actually increase their life
expectancy.  We can think of myriads of causal-counterfactual chains leading from
joining TIAA to changes in lifestyle that are causes of increased life expectancy (to the
extent anything is), and can imagine a person instantiating such changes.  (Imagine a
hard-drinking, smoking grad student who joins TIAA on getting her first academic job. 
She is sent a folio of information about how TIAA can help you get healthy by paying
for your nicotine patches, subsidizing your health club membership, etc. . . .).  But if the
singular-causing story holds even once, then contrary to our starting assumption, it is a
“causal law” that joining TIAA increases life expectancy -- given the reading of
Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement.
Finally, we should see how the pieces may fit together to offer a different,
arguably Humean, picture of effective strategies.
4. Humean effective strategies.
29Here I am joining NM’s and mechanisms, which are closely related things but not the same. 
The difference: a mechanism brings about a result fairly reliably, but the result need not be a
regularity, whether statistical or not.  A NM generates a regularity (fairly reliably).
30 It might be thought that this is too strong, and that surely if we have a positive
statistical relationship between C and E (perhaps holding fixed some possibly-relevant
and easy-to-measure further variables), then we have prima facie evidence that
increasing C is an effective strategy for producing more E.  I would deny even this
prima facie claim. There are myriads of positive statistical relationships out there in the
raw data, even ones that obtain given the stipulated constraints.  Few of these will we
ever measure, but they are there, and few of them correspond to genuine effective
strategies.  If, in practical experience, the kinds of variables we do measure and test in
these ways turn out often to reflect causal connections, that is because we had good
reason to suspect, prior to doing the statistical tests, that such a relationship might
obtain.  And such suspicions most often come from common sense and antecedent
causal/mechanical knowledge (i.e, from suspecting there is the right sort of NM or
mechanism to be found), not from noticing a statistical correlation.
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Cartwright’s early way of talking about effective strategies may work well in a
lot of cases, but in many others it tends to fall apart, as we have seen.  The remedy, it
seems to me, is to be even more stringent than CC in thinking about effective strategies,
but stringent in somewhat different directions.  Instead of looking for the complete sets
of causal factors for a given effect, what we need to do is look for mechanisms or
nomological machines – probabilistic or deterministic – that “produce” the effect.
Where we can create, or discern in nature, a mechanism or a NM for a given effect,
there we have a strategy for bringing it about.  Where we can’t find one, there we don’t
have an effective strategy, at least not one we have reason to think we can rely on.29
We may have statistical regularities, and we may follow our temptation to base an
effective strategy on the regularities.  It may even work successfully in some cases.  But
that is just getting lucky; without a mechanism or NM, we are shooting in the dark.30
By contrast, if you have a mechanism or NM for producing an effect, you don’t
need to know all the causes and preventatives of the given effect.  Instead, the
mechanism/NM builds in “shielding” from interference, of two kinds.  First, overt
shielding from known disturbances, about which I have nothing in particular to say. 
Second, shielding by random initial and boundary conditions:  the NM relies on
nature’s own fortuitous tendency to distribute uniformly the microscopic factors that
might skew the results in undesired ways.  This is of course analogous to the way in
which human experimenters try to control for unknown skewing factors by randomized
controlled experiments.  But at a relatively microscopic level of description, Nature
usually takes care of the randomizing for us, and that – part of the Humean
supervenience pattern in the actual events – is a key fact around which many of our
mechanisms and NMs are based. 
A good example of such an NM to illustrate the role of nature’s randomizing is
the classical statistical-mechanical model of something like an ice cube being used to
cool down a tepid drink.  The model may not correspond to reality – it doesn’t have to,
to serve its illustrative purposes.  But it may well so correspond, in its salient features.
What could be a more effective strategy for cooling down a tepid drink, than
dropping a couple of ice cubes in it?  Few things in this world are so reliable.  But
according to the classical stat-mech model, the strategy works not because of iron
deterministic law, nor because of primitive causal powers of ice cubes to cool. Instead,
the micro-motions of the liquid and the ice cubes are going to be almost always such
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that the future evolution of the system (ignoring outside influences) involves approach
to equilibrium, with the equilibrium temperature being of course cooler than the initial
temp of the liquid.  This is the story, ignoring outside influences (and many other
complications).  But we should not ignore the environment: for this to be a good
nomological machine for cooling drinks, it must be adequately shielded from outside
heating.  It must also be shielded from coincidentally unfortunate boundary conditions
(BCs), i.e., bumps from the outside that just happen, by bad luck, to be such as to keep
the liquid + ice mixture moving away from equilibrium rather than toward it.  But we
don’t provide this second kind of shielding; nature does that for us, via the reliable
typicality and randomness of ICs and BCs to be found at the (relative) micro-level. 
Like any NM, it may on some occasion fail, but this one is a pretty good one compared
to most that we devise.  And notice one key point:  the randomness (random-
lookingness) of the micro-movements of molecules that is a key aspect of the pattern of
actual events for a Humean account of objective chance is also the crucial to the
functioning of this NM.
Laws and initial conditions underlie this SNM, not causes or capacities.  Of
course, this model of the situation relies on an ontological picture (billiard-ball style
molecules interacting by action-at-a-distance forces, under Newtonian mechanical laws)
that Cartwright would find incredible.  And it may indeed be nothing more than a
fiction.  But if it is, it is a fiction that still works remarkably well at modelling one of
nature’s most reliable regularities.  In light of it, and other examples that we could
multiply indefinitely (the coin-flipping machine being another, for example), the claim
that we should resign ourselves to causal fundamentalism in understanding our NMs
seems premature.
Let me illustrate the NM-based view of effective strategies with a final case, the
infamous heart-disease and exercising example, to point up how it is true to what we
actually do when looking for real mechanisms in nature.  The initially observed
correlation between smoking and having less heart disease does not prompt us to
immediately seize on smoking as an effective strategy for reducing heart disease
(though it might be, if somehow smoking induces people to exercise who otherwise
wouldn’t).  Rather it induces us to look to see if there might be a NM or mechanism
linking smoking to reduced heart disease.  There are two sides to this task.  First, we
may conduct further statistical studies to try to verify whether there really is such a
mechanism at work, tests that give evidence that such a linkage exists without doing
much to reveal what the mechanism is.  For such tests the danger of misleading
correlations is always there, and the implicit advice of CC – hold fixed known causally
relevant factors as much as you can, and randomize – is of course correct as far as it
goes.  Second, we may directly test possible NM mechanisms via  the hypothetico-
deductive and other methods. We can no doubt immediately think of several ideas to
test out:  for example, nicotine might enter the bloodstream and have the effect of
dissolving small clots inside the arteries, making the blood run more freely.  Testing
this might be more or less tricky, and depending on how it was done, might have more
or less risk of deception via the exercise-heart disease link (or other correlations).  But
some tests of potential NMs might be fairly easy to do, and not have to rely on
inferences made from mechanism-blind statistical studies.
The search for a NM or mechanism linking smoking to heart disease (or its
prevention) is not a search for a causal law (as implicitly defined by CC), nor is it a
search for singular causings.  In these senses, I would say that the search is Humean-
neutral:  it does not imply causal fundamentalism at the level of the relationship under
31 Stuart Glennan seems to have a similar suspicion in his discussion of the mechanism-based view of
causation.  See (1996) section 4.
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study, nor does it imply that a non-Humean notion of causation is not needed, at the
lower level where we describe the workings of mechanisms or NMs.
5. Conclusion.  What I hope to have shown in this rambling discussion is that the
framework of Cartwright’s early discussions of causal laws and effective strategies is a
in many ways fragile, and that a different view of effective strategies is possible that
makes use of her later concept of a nomological machine (and/or Glennan’s concept of
a mechanism).  This view fits nicely with the Humean approach to objective
probabilities that I advocate, which is agnostic about causation.  The alternate view of
effective strategies based on NMs is not meant to be Humean-sanitized, vis a vis
causation:  (i) I have not tried to revive the Humean project of defining “causal” facts
purely in terms of statistical relations, a doomed project; (ii) as we dug into the various
mechanisms by which causes such as aspirins effectively produce effects such as
headache-relief, we had causal talk popping up frequently at the lower levels of
description.  But this doesn’t mean that regularities (statistical, law-like or merely
universal) are not enough to reconstruct what is going on, or that we need to fall back
on some notion of causal capacity or causal law as a primitive, at the lower level.  It
means that the question is left open, and we can remain agnostic.  My personal
suspicion is that talk of causal capacities and causal laws can be replaced by Humean
NM’s all the way down to a level where all that is left are iron deterministic physical
laws and fortunate accidental regularities.31 Lots of fortunate regularities, which
underlie at least as much of the predictability and stability of nature that we count on as
the iron laws do (as we see in the ice-melting example).  But this is not something I
claim to have shown.  Instead, what I hope my discussion has shown is that, at the level
of the original “causal laws” that Cartwright wished us to accept, we can reject the
need for any such things as primitives, and also reject their correlate singular-causings
(taken, again, as primitives), and thereby make room, at the level of these causal laws,
relations and effective strategies, for a more Humean approach to succeed.
Finally, let me stress that most of the points I have tried to make here are in
harmony with Cartwright’s most recent work on causation and probability, in The
Dappled World (especially chapters 4, 5 and 7).  The lessons I would wish to draw might
be put this way: talk of causal laws should perhaps be avoided where possible, and the
fact that causal capacities exist because of underlying mechanisms deserves more
emphasis and investigation.  Or more bluntly: it is better not to be too much of a causal
fundamentalist.
A further result of these considerations seems to me worth mentioning (one that has been
implicit in Cartwright’s work from How the Laws of Physics Lie onward, but especially
strongly in The Dappled World):  the proposed methodology of trying to read off useful
causal conclusions (hence effective strategies) from purely statistical data is really
hopeless.  In the first book, it proved hopeless because to decide that C was a cause of E
(and hence a handle for increasing the level of E, at least in principle), you had to know
all the other causes of E first.  The methods of Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (SGS,
1993) are meant to help one partially circumvent that problem, and they build in all sorts
of idealistic features to their causal graph-systems to try to make it work (e.g. CMC,
faithfulness).  In Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement and The Dappled World,
Cartwright argues very effectively that these assumptions are implausible, for the real
32 And, as Cartwright has stressed, there is another topic that might be more useful to
address: the nomological machines that do exist out there in the world.  “[A] causal
structure arises from a nomological machine and holds only conditional on the proper
running of the machine; and the methods for studying nomological machines are
different from those we use to study the structures they give rise to.  Unfortunately
these methods do not yet have the kind of careful articulation and defence that Spirties,
Glymour and Scheines and the Pearl group have developed for treating causal
structures.”  (1999), pp. 134 – 5.
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world in general.  That is bad enough already.  But perhaps the worst problem of all is
one she doesn’t sufficiently highlight: most of the objective probabilities one needs as
input simply don’t exist.  There are SNMs in the world, including some we don’t
ourselves make.  But they are hardly ubiquitous.  And where they don’t exist, the
methods of Pearl and SGS may be literally inapplicable.  Unfortunately, such methods
are most likely to be needed and desired in precisely the sorts of fields (like
macroeconomics) where it is extremely implausible that all the probabilities needed
really exist.  In those areas, what we have are at best what I would call mere statistics,
not probabilities.
The difference is crucial.  When you have a set of variables that are all connected
by NM-like stable structures (or, using the SGS terminology, whose values are
generated by a causal graph), there is at least some prima facie plausibility to the claim
that the data will conform to the causal Markov condition and to faithfulness.  But for
the messy domains of mere statistics, what sort of arguments can be given for these
conditions?  You can only argue for their holding after you know that the statistics were
generated by a real causal structure (i.e., a set of NMs and/or SNMs).  But the SGS
methods are supposed to start with mere statistical data, and search out a causal structure
hidden underneath.  Evidently, this can only be justified if one assumes that all sets of
statistical data we may get hold of, arise out of some causal structure or other involving
just those variables.  This is unlikely not only because we will often latch onto irrelevant
variables (and leave out relevant ones), but also for the reason stressed by Nancy
Cartwright:  much of what happens may occur just “by hap”.  What this means for our
purposes here is:  much of what happens is not appropriately thought of as “arising from
a causal structure among event-types” or “happening because of the causal laws of the
universe.”
The question the causal modellers need to address is this:  can any argument for
the potential utility of such methods be mounted, given that we must largely work with
mere statistics that we know are not generally objective probabilities?  Instead of further
proofs of how we can get true conclusions from ideally perfect probabilities assuming
very strong conditions such as CMC and faithfulness, what is needed is some
exploration of this difficult question.32
21
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Henrik Zinkernagel, Jordi Cat, Mauricio Suarez, José Díez, Paul
Teller, and Stuart Glennan for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.  Special
thanks go to Nancy Cartwright, whose extensive comments tried to set me straight about
a number of issues and led to important improvements in the text.  Needless to say, none
of the above endorse anything written here.
References
Cartwright, N. How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford University Press, 1983). 
Cartwright, N. Natures Capacities and their Measurement (Oxford University Press,
1989).
Cartwright, N. The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science (Cambridge
University Press, 1999).
Dupré, J. & Cartwright, N.  “Probability and Causality: Why Hume and Indeterminism
Don’t Mix”, Noûs 22, 521 - 36.
Glennan, S. (1996) “Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation”, Erkenntnis 44, 49 - 71.
Glennan, S. (1997)“Capacities, Universality, and Singularity”, Philosophy of Science 64,
605 - 626.
Glennan, S. (2002) “Contextual Unanimity and the Units of Selection Problem”,
Philosophy of Science ??, 2002.
Hoefer, C. (1997) “On Lewis’ Objective Chance: Humean Supervenience Debugged”,
Mind 106 no. 422.
Hoefer, C. (2003) “The Third Way on Objective Chance”, unpublished manuscript.
Norton, J. (2003) “Causation as FolkScience”,
http://www.philosophersimprint.org/003004/
Otte, R. (1985) “Probabilistic Causality and Simpson’s Paradox”, Philosophy of Science
52, 110 - 125.
Spirtes, P., Glymour, C., and Scheines, R. Causation, Prediction and Search (Springer-
Verlag, 1993).
